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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW
New York Court of Appeals holds for the first time that an x-ray is a writing
subject to the best evidence rule, thereby admitting secondary evidence to
describe the contents of a lost x-ray
The "'oft-mentioned and much misunderstood"' best evidence rule
requires a party to produce the best attainable evidence to prove a disputed
fact or issue.' Usually, the original document itself is the best evidence
of its contents. A well recognized exception to this rule, however, is that
when the absence of an original writing is explained to the satisfaction of
I Schozer v. William Penn Life Ins. Co., 84 N.Y.2d 639, 643, 644 N.E.2d 1353, 1355. 620
N.Y.S.2d 797, 799 (1994) (citing Sirico v. Cotto, 67 Misc. 2d 636, 637,324 N.Y.S.2d 483.485
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1971); Trombley v. Seligman. 191 N.Y. 400, 84 N.E. 280 (1908)).
One of the fundamental principles of evidence is that the best evidence of which
a case is in its nature susceptible, and which is within the power of the party to
produce or is capable of being produced, must be adduced in proof of a disputed fact
or issue. Secondary evidence, or evidence which is substitutional in nature, may not
be introduced over objection unless the primary evidence is unavailable to the party
offering the secondary or substitutionary evidence. This rule is founded on the
presumption that there may be something in the withheld better evidence which would
be adverse to the party resorting to inferior evidence.
The rule is satisfied by the production of the best attainable evidence. The
requirement of the best evidence applicable to each particular fact means that no
evidence of a nature merely substitutionary is to be received where the primary
evidence is producible. Therefore, the best evidence rule states in effect that a
document is itself the best evidence of its contents and that a party who desires to
produce evidence of the contents of a document upon an issue raised in reference
thereto must produce the document if it is in existence and within his power to
produce. In other words, the rule is that where proof is to be made of some fact which
is recorded in a writing by what appears in the writing, the best evidence of the
contents of the writing consists in the production of the document itself.
57 N.Y. JUR. 2D Evidence & Witnesses § 247 (1986) [hereinafter Evidence & Witnesses]
(citations omitted); see 4 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 1177-
83, at 417 (1972) (stating early common law rationale for rule as "between ... a literal copy and
the original, the copy is always liable to errors on the part of the copyist"). With the reliability
of modem copying processes, this rationale has been modified to protect against "testimony and
other forms of secondary evidence offered to prove the content of an original rather than against
the use of duplicates." CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, MODERN
EVIDENCE § 10.1, at 1579 (1995).
The best evidence rule in New York applies equally to civil and criminal actions. See Torr
v. Torr, 18 A.D.2d 722, 236 N.Y.S.2d 252 (2d Dep't 1962) (civil actions); People v. Burgess,
244 N.Y. 472, 155 N.E. 745 (1927) (criminal actions).
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the court, secondary evidence is admissible to establish the contents of the
unproduced original.2 Generally, the court will excuse the loss of an
original where the party attempting to enter secondary evidence of the
document: 1) makes a showing of a diligent search in the area where the
document was last known to have existed;3 and 2) produces testimony of
the person who last possessed it.4
2 See Trombley v. Seligman, 191 N.Y. 400,403, 84 N.E. 280, 281 (1908): EDITH L. FISCH,
FISCH ON NEW YORK EVIDENCE §§ 81-82, 96-97 (1977). -The best evidence rule requires the
production of an original writing whenever its contents must be proved, and prohibits the intro-
duction of secondary evidence unless a satisfactory explanation is presented for the absence of
the original." Id. § 81; see 4 WIGMORE, supra note 1. The exception to the best evidence rule
seems to be predicated upon the infeasibility of producing the original because, of such reasons
as: loss of the document; detention of the document by the opponent or third party; detention by
the law; and destruction of the document. See id. § 1192, at 436.
The Federal Rules of Evidence, however, depart from common law by allowing the use of
duplicates. See FED. R. EVID. 1003 (permitting admission of duplicates unless there is question
of authenticity of duplicate). In challenging the admissibility of the duplicate, the challenging
party has the burden of explaining why the duplicate should not be admitted. See United States
v. Garmany, 762 F.2d 929 (1 lth Cir. 1985) (shifting burden to party challenging admissibility
of duplicate), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1062 (1986): 3 SALTZBURG ET AL.. FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE MANUAL 1755 (6th ed. 1994). For a determination of whether x-rays are within the
scope of Rule 1003 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, see United States v. Leight, 818 F.2d 1297
(7th Cir.). cert. denied, 484 U.S. 958 (1987), which answers in the affirmative.
Schozer. 84 N.Y.2d at 644, 644 N.E.2d at 1355, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 799 (citing Cole v.
Canno. 168 A.D. 178, 153 N.Y.S. 957 (3d Dep't 1915); Dan v. Brown, 4 Cow. 483, 491
(1825)): Evidence and Witnesses, supra note 1, § 262.
Where it becomes necessary to prove loss of the original of an instrument in order
to give secondary evidence as to its contents, it should be shown that reasonable search
was made and that the available sources of information and means of discovery
suggested by the circumstances have not enabled the party to find and produce the
original paper or record.
The contents of a lost instrument cannot be proved unless it appears that
reasonable search has been made in the place where the document was last known to
have been. If it is shown to have been in a particular place or in the custody of a
particular person, that place should be searched or the person who had custody should
be produced. . . . The testimony of the last custodian is usually required. The more
important the document as proof, the stricter becomes the requirement of the
evidentiary foundation for the admission of secondary evidence of the contents thereof.
But the sufficiency of the proof of loss is a question of fact for the trial judge, rarely
reviewed on appeal.
Id. (citations omitted).
' Schozer, 84 N.Y.2d at 644, 644 N.E.2d at 1355, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 799 (citing FISCH, supra
note 2. §§ 88-89).
Loss or destruction is frequently invoked to justify the use of secondary evidence
to prove the contents of a document. Though provable by direct evidence, these facts
are more often established by a circumstantial inference based upon the showing of an
unsuccessful search that has encompassed all reasonable efforts to discover the writing.
In some instances this may require the production as a witness of the person last known
to have had possession of the document, or the introduction of his deposition if he is
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Much difficulty has arisen concerning the definition of a "writing" in
the context of the best evidence rule.5 Modem technology has forced
many states to expand their definitions of a "writing" to include documents
such as x-rays.6 In the past, New York courts confronted with the issue
have disagreed as to whether an x-ray is a writing subject to the best
evidence rule and, therefore, subject to the exception for unattainable
originals.7 Recently, in Schozer v. William Penn Life Insurance Co.,8 the
outside the jurisdiction.
Destruction of the original by an adverse party regardless of his motive or reason
for doing so, permits the use of secondary evidence by his opponent. Secondary
evidence is also admissible even where the proponent himself has destroyed the
original, provided he establishes that it was not done fraudulently or to create an
excuse for its non-production. The evidence must be stronger where the circumstances
are suspicious, or a motive or fraudulent design to evade production appears, than
where such indications are absent. It appears that these rules also apply to the
proponent of secondary evidence who has caused the identity of the original to be lost.
FISCH, supra note 2, § 89.
" See FISCH, supra note 2, § 85 (noting that "best evidence rule is applicable to all writings,
even those inscribed on an object such as a painting, piece of sculpture or a building").
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence the scope of a writing has been enlarged to expressly
include:
(1) Writings and recordings. "Writings" and "recordings" consist of letters, words,
or numbers, or their equivalent, set down by handwriting, typewriting, printing,
photostating. photographing ....
(2) Photographs. "Photographs" include still photographs, x-ray films, and motion
pictures.
(3) Original. An "original" of a writing or recording is the writing or recording itself
.... An "original" of a photograph includes the negative or any print therefrom.
FED. R. EvID. 1001. The rationale for the expansion of the scope was that "[p]resent day
techniques have expanded methods of storing data." FED. R. EvID. 1001 advisory committee's
notes.
6 See Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Indiana Rules of Evidence, 27 IND. L. REV., 1063, 1091 (1994)
(noting Indiana extends best evidence rule to include x-rays); Gregory S. Cusimano & Michael
L. Roberts, ProposedAlabama Rules ofEvidence: What's The Same? What's Different?. 45 ALA.
L. REV. 109, 140 (1993) (noting expansion of Alabama law to include x-rays under best evidence
rule); James J. Hippard, Sr., Article X: Contents of Writings, Recordings, and Photographs, 30
Hous. L. REV. 1093, 1114-15 (1993) (noting applicability of Rule 703 concerning x-rays thereby
limiting application of Rule 1002); Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOwA L.
REV. 227, 261 n. 173 (1988) (noting extension of applicability of best evidence rule to prove
contents of x-rays); Olin Guy Wellborn III, The "Best Evidence" Article of the Texas Rules of
Evidence, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 99, 105 (1986) (noting best evidence rule may be invoked to
require production of x-ray where x-ray is central to diagnosis and controversy exists as to its
meaning).
' See Schozer, 84 N.Y.2d at 644, 644 N.E.2d at 1356, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 800 (citing cases
which have applied best evidence rule to x-rays); see also id. at 648-49, 644 N.E.2d at 1358, 620
N.Y.S.2d at 802 (Simons, J., dissenting) (citing cases which have precluded the application of
best evidence rule to x-rays).
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New York Court of Appeals held that an x-ray is a writing subject to the
best evidence rule, and to the exception to the rule, thereby resolving this
issue for purposes of New York evidence law.9
The New York Court of Appeals, reversing the order of the Appellate
Division, Second Department,' 0 expressly rejected the view that the best
evidence rule creates "an absolute bar" to the admission of secondary
evidence to establish the contents of a lost x-ray." Writing for the
majority in a 5-2 decision, Judge Titone examined the decisions of lower
courts which confronted this issue and concluded that the best evidence rule
and its exception for unproduced originals has been applied with equal
weight to unavailable x-rays and the secondary evidence offered to describe
their contents.1 2 Additionally, the court found that its decision paralleled
the standard formulation followed by the Federal Rules of Evidence and a
84 N.Y.2d 639, 644 N.E.2d 1353, 620 N.Y.S.2d 797 (1994).
The facts of the case are as follows: the defendant, William Penn Life Insurance Company
of N.Y., believing that the claimant's medical history indicated a potential heart condition which
would have disqualified him from the coverage he sought, requested that he complete a physical
examination and have an x-ray taken. Id. at 642, 644 N.E.2d at 1354, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 798.
Schozer complied with the insurance company's request and the x-ray taken was thereafter
analyzed by the defendant's medical director, a radiologist. Id. The radiologist's written report
concluded that Mr. Schozer had an enlarged heart. Less than one month later, before the
defendant had rejected or accepted the claimant's application for insurance. Schozer died from
a cause unrelated to a heart condition. Id. Thereafter, the defendant insurer rejected the claimant's
application and returned the premium paid. Id. Roughly two years later, the plaintiff, who was
the decedent's wife, commenced an action against the insurance company to recover the insurance
proceeds available under the conditional receipt. Schozer. 84 N.Y.2d at 642, 644 N.E.2d at 1354.
620 N.Y.S.2d at 798. The defendant disclaimed liability based on the fact that Schozer had an
enlarged heart at the time he applied for the life insurance policy, thus rendering him an
unacceptable risk and uninsurable at the standard rate. Id. at 643. 644 N.E.2d at 1355. 620
N.Y.S.2d at 799. The defendant was unable to locate the x-ray and thus sought to introduce the
testimony and written report of the radiologist to establish that Schozer's x-ray would have
revealed an enlarged heart. Id. The plaintiff thereafter moved to preclude the evidence on the
ground that the best evidence rule creates "an absolute bar" to the admission of secondary
evidence in the absence of the original x-ray. Id.
9 Id. at 647, 644 N.E.2d at 1357, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 801.
10 Schozer v. William Penn Life Ins. Co., 197 A.D.2d 510, 602 N.Y.S.2d 203 (2d Dep't
1993), rev'd, 84 N.Y.2d 639, 644 N.E.2d 1353, 620 N.Y.S.2d 797 (1994).
" Schozer v. William Penn Life Ins. Co., 84 N.Y.2d 639, 646, 644 N.E.2d 1353, 1357, 620
N.Y.S.2d 797, 801 (1994).
12 Id. at 644-45. 644 N.E.2d at 1356, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 800 (citing Chiu v. Garcia, 75
A.D.2d 594, 426 N.Y.S.2d 803 (2d Dep't 1980) (holding that trial court erred in permitting
medical expert testimony based on x-rays which were not in evidence and absence of which was
not explained); Sirico v. Cotto, 67 Misc. 2d 636, 324 N.Y.S.2d 483 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County
1971) (holding that radiologist's opinion based upon x-ray plates not in evidence was inadmissible
where failure to produce x-ray plates was not explained)).
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number of other states.13
Judge Titone reasoned that since the proponent of secondary evidence
bears the heavy foundational burden of establishing to the court that the
evidence is an accurate portrayal of the original, the dangers of fraud and
prejudice normally associated with the admission of secondary evidence are
reduced. 14 Judge Titone further noted that a degree of danger exists any
time a witness is called upon to recount the terms of a lost document; thus,
there is no greater danger of fraud and prejudice in permitting a witness to
recount the contents of a lost x-ray than there is in allowing a witness to
13 Schozer, 84 N.Y.2d at 645, 644 N.E.2d at 1356, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 800.
The Federal Rules of Evidence expressly include x-rays in the definition of a -photograph.-
and thereafter define a photograph as a writing subject to the best evidence rule. Id. (citing FED.
R. EvID. 1001(2)). Furthermore, the Schozer court noted that a number of other states have either
included x-rays in their statutory definitions of a -writing" for best evidence rule purposes,
Schozer, 84 N.Y.2d at 645, 644 N.E.2d at 1356, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 800 (citing N.J. R. EVID.
§ 801(e) & 1994 comment, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-45.1; OR. REV. STAT. EVID. R. 1001(3),
Texas R. of Evid. § 1001(2)). or have "judicially applied the best evidence rule to x-rays." Id.
(citing Hernandez v. Pino, 482 So. 2d 450 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding best evidence rule
applicable to x-rays unintentionally lost or destroyed where experts had opportunity to examine
them); Daniels v. Iowa City, 183 N.W. 415, 416 (Iowa 1921)). But see Fuller v. Lemmons, 434
P.2d 145, 147 (Okla. 1967) (holding that admission of medical testimony based on x-ray not in
evidence was error).
The Schozer court contended that, as in the case of any missing original, once the court
excuses the absence of an x-ray, there are "[n]o categorical limitations placed on the types of
secondary evidence that are admissible." Schozer, 84 N.Y.2d at 645, 644 N.E.2d at 1356, 620
N.Y.S.2d at 800. Rather, "all competent secondary evidence is generally admissible to prove its
contents," id. (citing American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Points, 81 S.W.2d 762, 767 (Tex. Civ. App.
1935) (holding that expert testimony of contents of x-ray unproduced because located out of state
is admissible)), as long as admission of the secondary evidence does not "offend any other
exclusionary rule or policy." Id. (citing 5 J. WEINSTEIN, EVIDENCE 1001[2][01]).
," Schozer, 84 N.Y.2d at 646, 644 N.E.2d at 1356-57, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 800-01.
In order for the proffered evidence to be admissible, the trial court must be satisfied that the
evidence is authentic and reflective of the original. Id. at 645, 644 N.E.2d at 1356, 620 N.Y.S.2d
at 800 (citing United States v. Gerhart, 538 F.2d 807, 809 (8th Cir. 1976)). "[Ihe [federal] rules
allocate to the court preliminary questions such as authenticity, lack of an original and whether
the proponent has presented a sufficient foundation so that a 'reasonable juror could be convinced'
that the secondary evidence correctly reflects the contents of the original." Gerhart, 538 F.2d at
809 (citations omitted); see also Marion v. Coon Const. Co., 141 N.Y.S. 647 (3d Dep't 1913),
aff'd, 216 N.Y. 178, 110 N.E. 444 (1915). When oral testimony is given to establish the contents
of an unproduced writing, the proponent of the evidence must show that the witness has the
ability to "recount or recite, from personal knowledge, 'substantially and with reasonable
accuracy' all of its contents." Schozer, 84 N.Y.2d at 646, 644 N.E.2d at 1356, 620 N.Y.S.2d
at 800 (quoting RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE (10th ed) § 599, at 596). Finally, once the conditions
for admission of the secondary evidence are met, the opponent may attack the sufficiency of the
secondary evidence including the credibility of the witness "not as to admissibility but [as] to the
weight to be given the evidence, with [the] final determination left to the trier of fact." Id.
(quoting Gerhart, 538 F.2d at 809 n.2).
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recount the terms of any unproduced document, such as a contract or
lease."5 Therefore, while Judge Titone recognized that an opponent is
always at a disadvantage when cross-examining a witness about a lost
document, he noted that there was no justification to warrant the applica-
tion of a different rule in the case of an unproduced x-ray.' 6 He reasoned
that proponents of secondary evidence are discouraged from introducing
inaccurate evidence since such misbehavior may result in the jury drawing
unfavorable inferences. 7
In arriving at its decision, the Schozer court rejected the conclusion
drawn by Judge Simons in his dissent and lower courts that two earlier
court of appeals cases, Hambsch v. New York City Transit Authority'8 and
Marion v. Coon Construction Co.,' 9 called for "an absolute best evidence
rule bar" to the admission of secondary evidence to establish the contents
of an unproduced original x-ray film."° The Schozer court distinguished
Hambsch, where the court concluded that expert testimony was inadmissi-
ble without presentation of the underlying x-ray, concluding that the court
had not addressed the issue since no best evidence rule objection had been
made.2 Similarly, the Schozer court distinguished Marion, determining
that there the court of appeals based its holding that expert opinion
testimony was inadmissible in the absence of the underlying x-ray on the
fact that there was no proper foundation to ensure that the unproduced x-
ray accurately portrayed the plaintiff's fracture.2  Although the Schozer
court concluded that the existing case law did not per se preclude the
introduction of secondary evidence of a missing x-ray, where the necessary
"5 Schozer, 84 N.Y.2d at 646, 644 N.E.2d at 1357. 620 N.Y.S.2d at 801.
16 Id.
17 Id. (citing James J. Hippard. Sr.. Article X: Contents of Writings, Recordings, and
Photographs, 20 Hous. L. REV. 595, 611 (1983)).
18 63 N.Y.2d 723, 469 N.E.2d 516, 480 N.Y.S.2d 195 (1984).
19 216 N.Y. 178, 110 N.E. 444 (1915).
. Schozer, 84 N.Y.2d at 646, 644 N.E.2d at 1357, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 801.
Id. (citing Hambsch, 63 N.Y.2d at 725, 469 N.E.2d at 518, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 197).
In Hambsch, the plaintiffs doctor testified that, based on his reading of an x-ray of the
plaintiffs lower back, the plaintiff was suffering from spondylolisthesis, a misalignment of the
vertebra. Hambsch, 63 N.Y.2d at 725, 469 N.E.2d at 517, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 196. The court
concluded that it was error to permit the doctor's testimony based on an x-ray without producing
the x-ray and introducing it into evidence. Id. (citing Marion v. Coon Constr. Co., 216 N.Y.
178, 110 N.E. 444 (1915); Richter v. Trailways of New England, 28 A.D.2d 737, 738, 282
N.Y.S.2d 148 (2d Dep't 1967); Cellamare v. Third Ave. Tr. Corp., 273 A.D. 260, 77 N.Y.S.2d
91 (1st Dep't 1948)). The court, however, noted that since there was no objection to the doctor's
testimony, the matter was not preserved for the court's review. Id.
2- Schozer, 84 N.Y.2d at 645, 644 N.E.2d at 1356, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 800 (citingMarion, 216
N.Y. at 182, 110 N.E. at 446).
[Vol. 69:651
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showing of unavailability had been made, it appears that the court's recent
decision expands the law to a level not formerly accepted by the court of
appeals.
Judge Simons proffered a highly critical dissent' in which he argued
to affirm the Appellate Division's ruling that an x-ray report is inadmissible
without the introduction of the underlying x-ray, reasoning that such a
conclusion was consistent with "an unbroken line of New York deci-
sions."'24 He contended that no New York case cited to the court of
appeals had extended the best evidence rule and its exemption for
unavailable documents to missing x-rays.' Judge Simons specifically
2 Schozer, 84 N.Y.2d at 647, 644 N.E.2d at 1357, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 801 (Simons, J..
dissenting).
24 Id. at 647-48, 644 N.E.2d at 1358, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 802 (Simons, J.. dissenting) (citing
Hambsch, 63 N.Y.2d at 725, 469 N.E.2d at 518, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 197; Marion, 216 N.Y. at
182, 110 N.E. at 446); Ebanks v. New York City Transit Auth., 118 A.D.2d 363,504 N.Y.S.2d
640 (1st Dep't 1986) (holding testimony of medical expert inadmissible where x-ray on which
testimony was based was not produced), rev'd on other grounds, 70 N.Y.2d 621. 512 N.E.2d
297, 518 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1987); Chiu v. Garcia, 75 A.D.2d 594, 426 N.Y.S.2d 803 (2d Dep't
1980) (concluding that it was error for trial court to permit medical expert to testify about x-rays
not admitted into evidence), Richter v. Trailways of New England, 28 A.D.2d 737, 282
N.Y.S.2d 148 (2d Dep't 1967) (holding that it was prejudicial error to permit doctor's testimony,
over objection, about matters depicted on x-rays which doctor had taken but which were not
introduced into evidence); Cellamare v. Third Ave. Transit Corp., 273 A.D. 260, 77 N.Y.S.2d
91 (1st Dep't 1948) (finding prejudicial error where expert medical witness testified to contents
of x-rays without producing x-rays and introducing them into evidence); Gursslin v. Helenboldt,
259 A.D. 1064, 21 N.Y.S.2d 269 (4th Dep't 1940) (determining that expert medical witness
testifying to matters shown on x-ray without introducing x-ray in evidence was prejudicial error).
The dissent further noted that the rule has been applied to holdings based on other types of
medical evidence. Schozer, 84 N.Y.2d at 648, 644 N.E.2d at 1358, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 802
(Simons, J., dissenting) (citing Kosiorek v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 145 A.D.2d 935, 536
N.Y.S.2d 614 (4th Dep't 1988) (holding that expert medical testimony regarding tissue slides not
in evidence was inadmissible); Whalen v. Avis Rent-a-Car System. 138 Misc. 2d 959, 961, 529
N.Y.S.2d 52, 54 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't 1988) (holding that doctor's testimony concerning
report of non-testifying radiologist related to CAT scan which was not in evidence and, therefore
was inadmissible)).
I Schozer, at 649, 644 N.E.2d at 1358, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 802 (Simons, J., dissenting).
The dissent noted that Congress has drafted its statutory definition of a writing to include
a photograph or an x-ray. Id. (citing FED. R. EvID. 1001(2)). Judge Simons, however, argued
that the photograph or x-ray is usually used only as an aid to the witness' testimony. Id.
Testimony of what a photograph or an x-ray depicts, without production of the original is "most
unusual." Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 1002 advisory committee's notes). Judge Simons further
noted that the Committee recognized that in the case of unproduced x-rays, "substantial authority"
required the production of the original. Id. at 649, 644 N.E.2d at 1359, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 803
(citations omitted). Finally, the dissent distinguished New York law from the Federal Rules of
Evidence by noting that the admission of an x-ray as secondary evidence in federal courts is
partly justified by the fact that under the Federal Rules an expert may base his or her opinion on
facts not in evidence. Schozer, 84 N.Y.2d at 649, 644 N.E.2d at 1359, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 803
(citing FED. R. EvID. 703).
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argued that none of the decisions cited by the majority established a New
York rule that secondary evidence is admissible in the case of an unpro-
duced x-ray.26
Judge Simons raised two important issues in his dissent: whether a
doctor's report recounting the contents of an unproduced x-ray amounts to
expert testimony and, if so, whether expert testimony must be based on
facts before the court to be admissible. 27
Judge Simons answered the first issue in the affirmative, arguing that
the majority improperly permitted secondary evidence in the form of an
expert witness' report to establish the contents of the x-ray films.2  He
distinguished x-rays from other documents, such as leases and contracts,
and argued that a doctor's report or testimony recounting the contents of
an x-ray is neither a copy of the x-ray nor an objective statement of what
the x-ray portrays. Rather, it is an expert opinion interpreting the
unproduced x-ray on the basis of the expert's training and experience.29
His dissent supported the belief that such secondary evidence is expert
testimony, reasoning that "[t]he value of [x]-ray evidence rests largely on
the expert's interpretation of what it shows. . . . [and] reasonable medical
experts can read [x]-rays differently and their readings can only be tested
or verified by examining the picture they rely on."3"
I Schozer, 84 N.Y.2d at 649, 644 N.E.2d at 1358, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 802 (Simons. J..
dissenting).
Judge Simons argued that the cases the majority cited do not support the proposition that
New York courts have permitted secondary evidence in cases involving missing x-rays. Id. In
fact. Judge Simons contended that such a holding is contrary to existing New York law. Id. He
argued that the defendant's and the majority's reliance upon Chiu v. Garcia, 75 A.D.2d 594. 426
N.Y.S.2d 803 (2d Dep't 1980), is misplaced because that court's holding is ambiguous. In Chil,
the appellate division held that a doctor could not testify to the contents of x-rays not in evidence
or "whose absence was not explained." Schozer, 84 N.Y.2d at 648-49. 644 N.E.2d at 1358. 620
N.Y.S.2d at 802 (quoting Chiu, 75 A.D.2d 594, 426 N.Y.S.2d 803). Furthermore, the dissent
contended that the majority wrongly based its holding on Marion v. Coon Construction, 216 N.Y.
178, 110 N.E. 444 (1915). and Sirico v. Cotto, 67 Misc. 2d 636, 324 N.Y.S.2d 483 (N.Y. Civ.
Ct. N.Y. County 1971), since in both cases the majority relied on dictum. Schozer, 84 N.Y.2d
at 648-49, 644 N.E.2d at 1358, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 802 (Simons, J., dissenting).
- Schozer. 84 N.Y.2d at 647-51, 644 N.E.2d at 1357-60, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 801-04 (Simons.
J., dissenting).
2 Id. at 649, 644 N.E.2d at 1359, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 803 (Simons, J., dissenting).
29 Id. at 649, 644 N.E.2d at 1358, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 802 (Simons, J., dissenting).
- Schozer, 84 N.Y.2d at 650, 644 N.E.2d at 1359, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 803 (Simons, J.,
dissenting).
In applying this theory, the dissent reasoned that an expert's opinion that a patient suffered
from an enlarged heart, based on an unproduced x-ray, is -wholly insulated from contradiction"
since an opposing expert cannot determine the value of the opinion without examining the x-ray.
Id. 84 N.Y.2d at 650, 644 N.E.2d at 1359, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 803 (Simons, J., dissenting).
The dissent also rejected as impossible the majority's contention that the danger of receiving
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Upon concluding that a doctor's testimony or report recounting the
contents of an unproduced x-ray is equivalent to expert testimony, Judge
Simons refuted the majority's view that there is no difference between
admitting secondary evidence of a writing and admitting secondary
evidence of an x-ray.3' Judge Simons reasoned that expert testimony
evidence involves a two-step evaluation process in which the jury must
determine: 1) whether the facts upon which the expert is testifying have
been established and 2) the weight which should be given to the expert's
testimony based upon those facts.32  The evaluation of the contents of a
writing, however, entails only one step-the jury evaluating the reliability
of the secondary evidence.33 Therefore, if a doctor's testimony or report
relating to the contents of a lost x-ray is deemed to be "expert testimony,"
it should be subjected to a stricter test than ordinary "writings" in order to
be admissible.
Judge Simons also answered the second issue in the affirmative,
arguing that expert testimony must be based on facts in evidence.' Judge
Simons' basis for prohibiting the admission of expert testimony to establish
the contents of an unproduced x-ray was that generally witnesses are
permitted to testify only to facts, not opinions, and that expert opinions are
allowed only where lay jurors are unable to intelligently evaluate the facts
such secondary evidence can be avoided by the court ensuring that the doctor's report is
"authentic and 'correctly reflects the contents' of the x-ray." Id. (quoting majority).
It is not a question of 'mistrusting' the doctor's report, as the majority seems to believe
; it is a question of whether the doctor's report will supply a factual basis for his
opinion. The expert's opinionol has no greater probative force than the basis on which
.. it is foundedl-] . . . ,and the expert's self-serving and unverifiable reading of the
X-ray does not supply the necessary predicate to support an opinion. It would seem
that in these circumstances the reception of secondary evidence, rather than preventing
fraud or prejudice, would facilitate it.
Id. at 651, 644 N.E.2d at 1359-60, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 803-04 (Simons, J., dissenting).
32 Id. 84 N.Y.2d at 650, 644 N.E.2d at 1359. 620 N.Y.S.2d at 803 (Simons, J., dissenting).
I d. (Simons, J., dissenting).
" Schozer, 84 N.Y.2d at 650, 644 N.E.2d at 1359, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 803 (Simons, .,
dissenting). "The evaluation of expert opinion evidence involves a two-step process: the jury must
first determine whether the proponent has established the facts upon which the expert opinion
rests and then determine the weight which should be accorded the expert's opinion based upon
those facts." Id. (Simons, J., dissenting).
The dissent argued that since the doctor's report does not establish the facts, without the x-
ray there in no evidence to support the doctor's opinion. Id. The dissent further contended that
since the only factual foundation for the expert's opinion is the expert's own analysis of an
unproduced x-ray, the opinion is merely speculative. Id. at 650-51, 644 N.E.2d at 1359, 620
N.Y.S.2d at 803 (Simons, J., dissenting).
3 Id. at 648, 644 N.E.2d at 1358, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 802 (Simons, J.. dissenting).
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without the assistance and special knowledge of experts.35 From this
general proposition, Judge Simons determined that an expert opinion, to be
admissible, must be based upon facts before the court-facts acquired either
by evidence in the record or by personal observation.3 6 Therefore, Judge
Simons reasoned that since the doctor in the Schozer case did not
personally examine the decedent's heart, his opinion should have been
based solely on evidence in the record.37 Since the x-ray upon which his
opinion was based was not in evidence, Judge Simons concluded that "the
record lacked the necessary factual predicate for admission of his
opinion.31
According to one legal commentator, however, for over twenty years
the New York Court of Appeals has allowed two exceptions to the general
proposition that experts may not testify to material not in evidence.39 In
People v. Sugden,4 the court held that experts may testify to out of court
material where the material is either "accepted in the profession as reliable
for forming a professional opinion," often referred to as the "professional
reliability exception," or where the material "comes from a witness who
is subject to full cross-examination at trial."41 The proposition that expert
testimony is inadmissible when based on facts not in evidence was
addressed even more specifically by the court of appeals in Hambsch.
There the court concluded that in order for the professional reliability
3 Schozer, 84 N.Y.2d at 648. 644 N.E.2d at 1357, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 801 (Simons. J..
dissenting).
36 Id. (Simons, J., dissenting).
3 Id. (Simons, J., dissenting). "As a general rule, witnesses must testify to facts and not their
opinions and conclusions drawn from the facts .. . .It is the sole province of the jury to draw
inferences from the facts." RICHARD T. FARRELL, ET AL. ON EVIDENCE § 7-101 (1 1th ed. 1995)
1 Schozer, 84 N.Y.2d at 650. 644 N.E.2d at 1359. 620 N.Y.S.2d at 803 (Simons. J..
dissenting).
A physician-whether testifying in person or submitting a written report-who states
his opinion ...is wholly insulated from contradiction if the x-ray on which that
opinion is based is not before the court but appears only by the description in the
report to the client. An opposing expert cannot judge the value of the opinion or
contradict it if he or she has only the opponent's statements of what was in the x-ray.
Id.
9 Michael Martin, X-Rays and the Best Evidence Rule, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 10, 1995, at 3. 4,
col. 1, 5 (citing People v. Sugden, 35 N.Y.2d 453, 460-61, 323 N.E.2d 169, 172, 363 N.Y.S.2d
923, 929 (1974)); see People v. Jones, 73 N.Y.2d 427, 430, 539 N.E.2d 96, 97, 541 N.Y.S.2d
340, 342 (1989); Hambsch v. New York City Transit Auth., 63 N.Y.2d 723, 726. 469 N.E.2d
516. 518, 480 N.Y.S.2d 195, 196 (1984); People v. Stone, 35 N.Y.2d 69, 74, 315 N.E.2d 787,
790, 358 N.Y.S.2d 737, 741 (1974): People v. DiPiazza, 24 N.Y.2d 342, 351, 248 N.E.2d 412.
417, 300 N.Y.S.2d 545, 552 (1969). See generally D. Capra, Permissible Bases of Expert
Testimony, N.Y. L.J., July 14, 1989, at 3.
4 35 N.Y.2d 453, 323 N.E.2d 169. 363 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1974).
41 Id. at 460-61, 323 N.E.2d at 173, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
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exception to be implemented there "must be evidence establishing the
reliability of the out-of-court material."42 Therefore, contrary to Judge
Simons' dissent, expert testimony based on out of court material is
admissible where it has met the threshold reliability test. The Schozer
majority's failure to address this issue, however, appears to leave unclear
the applicability of the Sugden test to expert testimony regarding unpro-
duced x-rays. According to one commentator, this only "adds to the
continuing confusion in this area."43
In conclusion, it seems that the issue of whether an x-ray is a writing
subject to the best evidence rule and whether secondary evidence is
admissible to prove the contents of an unproduced x-ray had been
unresolved in New York prior to the Schozer decision. The Schozer
decision is worthy of praise since it recognized the purposes behind the best
evidence rule. As the majority noted, imposing a strict requirement for
production of the original writing would extinguish many valid legal claims
and defenses, punishing parties who have, through no bad faith or
mischief, lost or destroyed an original.' Such a rigid requirement would
frustrate the purposes of the best evidence rule.
It is submitted, however, that the court's admission of the doctor's
report of the lost x-ray, without addressing the two important issues raised
by Judge Simons in his dissent, resulted in the creation of an ambiguous
rule. It is unclear whether the Court of Appeals has left us with a standard
form to apply when attempting to admit secondary evidence to prove the
contents of a missing x-ray. The court asserts that the proponent of
secondary evidence bears the heavy burden of establishing that the evidence
is a "reliable and accurate portrayal of the original," but fails to identify
a way this can be achieved without solely relying on the witness'
12 Martin, supra note 39, at 4 (citing Hambsch v. New York City Transit Auth., 63 N.Y.2d
723, 726. 469 N.E.2d 516, 518, 480 N.Y.S.2d 195, 197 (1984); Borden v. Brady, 92 A.D.2d
983, 984, 461 N.Y.S.2d 497, 498 (3d Dep't 1983) (Yesawich, J., concurring); People v. Gupta,
87 A.D.2d 991. 991, 450 N.Y.S.2d 124, 124 (4th Dep't 1982); People v. Branton, 67 A.D.2d
664, 665, 412 N.Y.S.2d 35, 36 (2d Dep't 1979); People v. Miller, 57 A.D.2d 668, 669, 393
N.Y.S.2d 679, 679 (3d Dep't 1977); People v. Borcsok, 114 Misc. 2d 810, 811-13, 452 N.Y.-
S.2d 814, 814-16 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1982); People v. De Zimm, 112 Misc. 2d 753,
760-62. 447 N.Y.S.2d 585, 590-91 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins County 1981)).
43 Martin, supra note 39, at 4.
' Schozer, 84 N.Y.2d at 644, 644 N.E.2d at 1356, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 800. -[Tlhe failure to
excuse the loss of an original 'would in many instances mean a return to the bygone and
unlamented days in which to lose one's paper was to lose one's right.'" Id. (quoting MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE § 237, at 76 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992)).
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expertise.' An x-ray and a writing differ significantly in that an x-ray is
subject to interpretation whereas a written document is not. ' Therefore,
it is arguable that a doctor's testimony as to the contents of an unproduced
x-ray is similar to expert testimony, as the dissent asserts. Consequently,
admission of secondary evidence to prove the contents of a lost x-ray is
more likely to result in fraud or prejudice to the opponent of that evidence
than is the admission of secondary evidence to prove the contents of a
missing written document. Moreover, it is likely that a jury will not
recognize that an x-ray is subject to interpretation and will treat the
secondary evidence as conclusive. The proponent's burden of establishing
the reliability and accuracy of such secondary evidence to the satisfaction
of the court is a vague and ambiguous standard. It is submitted that
secondary evidence should be permitted to prove the contents of a lost x-
ray, but that such evidence should be subjected to a stricter standard,
perhaps the standard normally applied to expert testimony.
Anthony J. Albanese
4 Schozer, 84 N.Y.2d at 645, 644 N.E.2d at 1356. 620 N.Y.S.2d at 800. It is submitted that
the majority's contention that the proponents of secondary evidence will "naturally be discouraged
from introducing 'less convincing secondary evidence' because 'an opponent may cause the jury
to draw an unfavorable inference from such a strategy,'" id. at 646, 644 N.E.2d at 1357, 620
N.Y.S.2d at 801, places too much faith in the trial process and neglects to formulate a workable
standard.
46 Id. 84 N.Y.2d at 650, 644 N.E.2d at 1359, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 803 (Simons. J., dissenting).
Unlike a writing "[fthe value of X-ray evidence rests largely on the expert's interpretation of what
it shows. Manifestly, reasonable medical experts can read X-rays differently and their readings
can only be tested or verified by examining the picture they rely on." Id.
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